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iThe entire commercial speech doctrine, after all, represents an
accommodation between the right to speak and hear expression about
goods and services and the right of Government to regulate the sales
of such goods and services.”*
*Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law,p 903, 2nd Ed., 1988
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I.   INTRODUCTION
Writing for a unanimous Court in 1942, Justice Owen Roberts stated that the First
Amendment posed “no . . . restraint on Government as respects purely commercial advertising.”1  The
Court distinguished commercial from ideological speech and found no basis for First Amendment
protection for the former.  The Court rejected an attack on a New York City code provision
forbidding commercial advertising on city streets, such as the particular handbill in this case.  On this
Court sat such stalwart future supporters of an expanded view of the First Amendment’s speech
clause as Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and Frank Murphy.  Yet the Court’s opinion was brief
and almost summarily dismissed the concept that commercial speech was entitled to any First
Amendment protection as was political speech.  And there the matter stood for a quarter of a century
until the Court decided Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council in 1976.2
II.   THE STATE’S CONCERN FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE
PUBLIC VERSUS THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW
A Virginia statute prohibited a licensed pharmacist from advertising the price for any drugs
that may be dispensed only by prescription.  Such a practice was, in the words of the statute,
“unprofessional conduct.”  The Court ruled the statute unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.
 Refusing to declare any broad doctrine regarding commercial speech, the Court adopted a narrower
approach.  Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court, “If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks
all First Amendment protection . . . it must be distinguished by its content...it cannot be simply on a
commercial subject.”3  Rejecting as “simplistic” the expression “commercial speech” and attacking
the statute as “paternalistic” and one by which the public was “kept in ignorance,” the Court
emphasized the public’s right to know.  “If there is a right to advertise there is a reciprocal right to
receive such advertising.”4 Stressing that the issue in the case involved truthful information about
lawful activity, the Court did not give priority to the State’s concern for the possible misuse of that
information.  Blackmun wrote, “It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available that the First Amendment makes for
us.”5  The Court made clear that by rejecting the statute in this particular case it was not holding that
“commercial speech can never be regulated any more than all ‘political’ speech is absolutely
protected.” Justice Stewart in his concurrence emphasizes that false or deceptive advertising is not
protected.  Unlike ideological expression, commercial price and product advertising is confined to
the promotion of goods and services.  “. . . factual claims . . . may be tested empirically and corrected
to reflect the truth without in any manner jeopardizing the free dissemination of thought.”6
In his lone dissent, Justice Rehnquist gave credence to Virginia’s concern for protecting the
public, balancing that interest with the First Amendment.  The State’s attempt to discourage misuse
of prescription drugs is a legitimate concern.  “While prescription drugs are a necessary and vital part
of medical care and treatment, there are sufficient dangers attending their widespread use that they
simply may not be promoted in the same measure as hair cream, deodorants and toothpaste.”7  To
Justice Rehnquist, public welfare determinations took precedence.  Although a single dissenter here,
Rehnquist would command a bare majority for his view a decade later.
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III.  THE SUBSTANTIAL STATE INTEREST TEST
Four years after the Virginia case, the Court decided Central Hudson v. Public Service
Commission of New York.8  There the State Commission ordered electric utilities to cease all
advertising promoting the use of electricity because of insufficient supply due to the fuel shortage.
The Commission extended the ban against promotional advertising to conserve energy.
The Court, through Justice Powell, articulated a four-part analysis for commercial speech
cases 9 that differed somewhat from the Virginia Pharmacy Board case:
(1)  Is the expression protected?  The questions here were simply, was
it misleading and did it concern lawful activity?  (2)  Is the asserted
governmental interest substantial?  (3)  If the answers to the above are
positive, does the regulation directly advance the asserted interest? 
(4) Is the regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest?
Echoing  Justice Blackmun’s and Justice Stewart’s opinion in Virgin a Pharmacy Board, the
Court restates the theme that the First Amendment protects commercial speech from “unwarranted
governmental regulation . . . it protects not only the speaker but also assists consumers and furthers
the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information.”10  Where Central Hudson
differs from the Virginia case is in its concern for the interest of the State beyond the question of
truthfulness of the expression of lawful activity.   The State interest must be “substantial.”  Here the
Court found such an interest in energy conservation.  Yet the Court found the fourth part of the test
(is the regulation more extensive than necessary), despite the substantial State interest, too extensive.
 The total ban was not necessary, since other measures were available to further the legitimate interest
of New York.
It was this problem of the “substantial” state interest and too extensive a regulation that
bothered Justices Brennan and Bl ckmun in their concurrence.  They both felt the four-part test did
not “provide adequate protection for truthful, non-misleading, non-evasive commercial speech. . . .(it
was) not one to be applied when a State seeks to suppress information about a product in order to
manipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot regulate.”11   In the Court’s opinion
Powell defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience.”12   Brennan and Blackmun stated that they did not question the case as one
even involving commercial speech.  “There is no difference between commercial speech and other
protected speech to justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct
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through manipulation of the availability of information.”13  To hese Justices the distinction between
"commercial” and “ideological” is blurred. While the Court protects the promotional advertising here
because the State’s regulation is too extensive, we begin to see questions of definition added to the
issues of truthful expression, lawful activity, substantial state interest, and the extent of permissible
state regulation.
Again, Rehnquist dissents.  Neither questions of definition nor the four-part test seem
paramount to him.  The State interest in protecting the public is his rationale for upholding the State
law.  “I think it is constitutionally permissible for the Commission to decide that promotional
advertising is inconsistent with the public interest in energy conservation . . . (it) falls within the scope
of permissible state regulation of an economic activity of an entity . . . created by New York State.”14
IV.   DIVISIONS ON THE COURT
After dissenting in both the Virginia Pharmacy Board n  Central Hudson cases, where he
would have sustained State power as opposed to affirming First Amendment rights, Justice R hnquist
wrote for a bare majority in 1986 in Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 92 LEd
2, 266 .In this case we begin to see more clearly the ideological split among the Justices as the Court
worked its way through the question of the protection of commercial speech and the application of
the four-part test.  The problem of course was one of emphasis.  The five Justice majority and the
dissenters all accepted the Central Hudson test and came to different assessments.  The deeper
philosophical division was on the primacy of First Amendment considerations and the whole issue of
defining commercial speech.
In this case a statute permitted certain forms of casino gambling to exist, however, no casino
could advertise itself to the public.  Interpreting the statute narrowly as one aimed only at the
residents of the Commonwealth, but not at tourists, the Puerto Rico Superior Court upheld the
measure.  The Supreme Court accepted the assumption of the lower court and affirmed the decision
as “passing muster” under the Central Hudson test.  Since commercial speech is “no more than
proposing a commercial transaction”15   (quoting from Virginia Pharmacy Board), restricting such
speech, as is done in this case is not violative of the Constitutional protection.  Hence, all the majority
did here was to go through the statute and examine it vis-a-vis the four-pronged test.  The majority
found the speech lawful and not misleading, the Commonwealth had a substantial interest in reducing
gambling among its residents, the statute involved directly addressed that interest and was no more
extensive than necessary.
Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices Marshall and Blackmu , discards the Central
Hudson formula.  There is, he wrote, “. . . no difference between  commercial and other kinds of
speech to justify protecting commercial speech less extensively where, as here the Government seeks
to manipulate private behavior by depriving citizens of truthful information concerning lawful
activities.”16   Brennan was perfectly willing to accept the C n ral Hudson test but claimed the statute
failed it because it gave “Government unprecedented authority to eviscerate constitutionally protected
expression.”17     The dissenters felt that once you established a lawful activity i.e., casino gambling in
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Puerto Rico, the Government may not prohibit truthful information, “namely to keep its residents
ignorant.”18   In his separate dissent Stevens wrote of the measure that it was a “grotesquely flawed
regulation of speech.”19   By the time of the Posadas case the debate narrow down to two approaches
to the issue.  The dominant one to determine the rationale of the State interest once it determined that
the speech not deceptive. That rationale was to apply the Central Hudson test with its implied
assumption of legitimate State interest.  The second approach is to determine solely the truthfulness
of the speech.  Once that is conceded, the State interest becomes secondary and First Amendment
scrutiny applies.20
IV. THE MATERIAL AND DIRECT EFFECT TEST
In Rubin v. Coors,21 all members of the Court agreed with the 10th Circuit that a provision in
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935, prohibiting beer labels from displaying their alcohol
content, was invalid.  The governmental interest in question — the need to suppress the threat of
“strength wars” and prevent alcoholism — was not considered substantial enough, and the regulation
said the Court was “inconsistent with the protection granted to commercial speech.”22  Justice
Thomas, writing for the Court, stated that “...the Government must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”23  In other
words, the Government must show that the particular regulation advances its interest in a direct and
material way.  The Court claimed that no such proof was forthcoming.  There was no proof that the
goal of preventing strength wars was accomplished by this regulation.  Nor, as in Central Hudson,
did the Government use other options to attain the alleged interest.  The Court mentioned that a
regulation prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high liquor content would be “less intrusive
to...First Amendment’s rights.”24  Finally, Justice Thomas scorned the irrationality of the
Government’s regulatory scheme.  While the regulation in question prohibits the disclosure of alcohol
content on labels, federal regulations apply a contrary policy to beer advertising.  “The failure to
prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content in advertising which would seem to constitute a more
influential weapon in any strength war than labels, makes no rational sense if the Government’s true
aim is to suppress strength wars.”25
While all the Justices agreed on the result, Justice Stevens’ concurrence is significant as it
portends the differences that develop among the Justices regarding Cent al Hudson.  He here agrees
with Justice Blackmun’s approach that the truthfulness of the commercial speech is of overriding
concern.  Rejecting what he calls the “formalism” of the four-part test in Central Hudson, Justice
Stevens asserts that “. . . the Government’s asserted interest, that consumers should be uninformed
for their protection, does not suffice to justify restrictions on protected speech in any context. . . .”26
Justice Stevens relies on the free speech clause of the First Amendment alone, “regardless of the
standard of review,”27  to deny the validity of the regulation involved.  The public’s right to know
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is hampered by the asserted interest of the Government.  The speech clause “mandates rejection of
the Government’s proffered justification for this restriction...this...provision is nothing more than an
attempt to blindfold the public.”28
VI.   CONSISTENCY AND CONFUSION
In a case handed down in May of 1996, a state regulation restricting so-called “commercial”
speech was again declared unconstitutional following the pattern set two decades earlier in Virginia
Pharmacy Board, followed by Central Hudson and Coors, with only Posadas being a debatable
exception.  But in 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island 134L.Ed 2, 711, the Court was split on the
basic standards for reviewing restrictions on commercial speech.
In Liquormart, Rhode Island placed a complete ban on liquor price advertising in any manner
whatsoever, be it by vendors or through the news media.  Justice Stevens, who concurred in Coors,
wrote the Court’s opinion.  He begins by emphasizing not the four-part test of Centr l Huds n, but
by stressing the importance of the truthfulness as the rationale, distinguishing it from the traditional
ideological speech.  “The greater objectivity of commercial speech justified affording the State more
freedom to distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones and that the greater
‘hardiness’ of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the profit motive likely diminishes the chilling
effect that may attend its regulation.”29   Therefore, the Rhode Island statutes involved here are
immediately suspect because of the truthfulness and non-deceptive, non-coercive  character of the
labels. At that point “there is far less reason to depart from the vigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands.”30   Again, Justice Stevens reiterates the skepticism of regulations
that deprive the public of its right to know and “keep people in the dark for what the Government
perceives to be their own good.”31 The Court’s opinion does not pursue the four-part test of Central
Hudson.  Rhode Island  must  show that its interest in reducing alcohol consumption will be advanced
by the statutory regulation to a material degree.  “. . . We must determine whether the State has
shown that the price advertising ban will significantly reduce alcohol consumption.”32  The State
failed to do this despite its valid interest.  In other words, Rhode Island failed ‘to establish a
reasonable fit’ between its abridgment of speech and its temperance goal.”33
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia recites his long held and often stated principle of
Constitutional jurisprudence that in deciding a First Amendment (“an indeterminate text”) case not
involving the suppression of political ideas, “ I will take my guidance as to what the Constitution
forbids . . . from the long-accepted practices of the American people.”34   Scalia finds nothing of a
“national consensus” with regard to that issue,  hence he concurs solely on that ground.
Justice Thomas’ concurrence is the broadest and in some ways most unusual.  The author
of the Court's opinion in Coors, Thomas goes much farther in his concurrence in Liquormart.  It
has been noted that “the most remarkable and characteristically non-minimalist opinion came from
Justice Thomas . . . His opinion proposes to do so much so quickly and in a case in which none of
this was necessary, it is fair to say that his is the most surprising opinion . . . an originalist should
consult the historical record.”35
He rejects the balancing test of Central Hudson: “I do not believe it should be applied to a
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restriction of ‘commercial speech’ . . . when, as here, the asserted interest is one that is to be achieved
through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark.”36  At one point he seems to see no
distinction between commercial speech and other protected speech.  “I would adhere to the doctrine
. . . that all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant is
impermissible.”37  Thomas faults the Court’s finding that Rhode Island failed to show that its assent
was not advanced by the regulation.  Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court “seems to imply that if
the State had been more successful at keeping consumers ignorant...then the restriction might have
been upheld.”38  To Thomas, it is a question of ncommensurables — the value of knowledge versus
the value of ignorance.
A most narrow view is that of Justice O’Connor with whom Justices Rehnqu st, Souter, and
Breyer concur.  This concurrence also applies to the options available to the State (tax rates,
minimum  prices) through which the State could more constitutionally attain their interest in reducing
alcohol consumption.  Any new analysis of the standards of review for commercial speech was
unnecessary to these four Justices.
VII.   THE PROBLEM OF COERCED SPEECH AND PUBLIC POLICY
In a case handed down on June 25, 1997, the issue was, basically, whether Glickman v.
Wileman Brothers39 even involved commercial speech.  The closely divided Court in a 5-4 decision
held that the case did not concern First Amendment problems.  The dissent,  writt n by Justice
Souter, found that the Court wrongfully denied First Amendment protection for what the dissent
believed was a clear cut commercial speech case, to be governed by the Central Hudson t st.  The
issue became one of identifying and defining what exactly commercial speech involved.  The case was
the first commercial subsidy case  to come before the Court.  In Glickman, the Secretary of
Agriculture, pursuant to a 1937 statute, assessed producers of nectarines, plums, and peaches, and
the cost of advertising those fruits on radio, television, and in newspapers.  The advertising at issue
attributed only positive statements regarding the fruit.  A producer refused to pay the assessment,
claiming it  violated his First Amendment rights since it was compelled speech.  The Ninth Circuit,
relying on the C ntral Hudson test, held for the producer.  The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion
by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  The Court decided
that what was involved here was a question of economic policy by which Congress tried to control
the overproduction of farm goods, among other measures, by developing anti-competitive features
of the marketing orders such as are involved in this case.  The aim of the statute was “designed to
serve the producers’...common interest in promoting the sale of a particular product.”40 Since this
involved a statutory economic regulation and not a First Amendment problem “the same strong
presumption of validity that we accord to other policy judgments made by Congress”41 should be
applied to this particular feature of the Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.
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The Court resolved that the program does not prevent a producer from communicating any message
on his own, nor does it compel any person to engage in actual or symbolic speech, and that it was fair
to assume that the producers agree with the message about the nature of the fruit being marketed.
Therefore, being compelled to fund the advertisements raises no First Amendment issues regarding
commercial speech.  Justice Stevens, therefore, did not examine the usual tests applied to commercial
speech cases.  The Court views the issue as one of purely economic public policy.  “Our cases provide
. . . support for the proposition that assessments to fund a lawful collective program may sometimes
be used to pay for speech over the objection of some members of the group.” 42 The rationale of the
assessment requirement, the Court reasoned, rests not on a First Amendment issue, but on the
assumption that “in the volatile markets for agricultural commodities, the public will be best served
by compelling cooperation among producers in making economic decisions that would be made
independently in a free market.”43
Justice Souter’s long and closely reasoned dissent was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Scalia and Thomas.   The opinion focuses on the commercial speech issue.  The fact that the
governmental regulation is valid does not validate coerced subsidies for implementing that policy.
 “. . . the very reasons for recognizing that commercial speech falls within the scope of First
Amendment protection, likewise justifies the protection of those who object to subsidizing it against
their will. . . . Forced payment for commercial speech should be subject to the same level of judicial
scrutiny  as any restriction on communication in that category.” 44 Merely because the statute is a
valid attempt to solve a national problem of agricultural production, and because  the goal and
purpose of the Marketing Act is constitutionally valid, does not permit the implementation by coerced
assessments.  “The challenged burden on dissenter’s (producers) First Amendment rights is
substantially greater than anything inherent in regulation of the Commercial transactions.”45   Whether
the producers agree or disagree with the message is not the issue.  Rather, the producers may wish
a different form of expression.   “. . . Laws requiring an individual to engage in or pay for expressive
activities are reviewed under the same standard that applies to laws prohibiting one from engaging
or paying for such activities. . . . What may not be suppressed may not be coerced.”46
Once the dissent found the issue to be one of commercial speech, it went on to examine in
great detail the four-pronged Central Hudson test.  On all three counts the test failed.  “Central
Hudson calls for some showing of plausibility and there has been none here.” 47
Adhering to his disdain for the Central Hudson test, Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent,
joined by Justice Scalia.  He again iterates the lack of difference between speech — commercial or
ideological.   Justice Thomas wrote of his concern for two “disturbing consequences.”
“Either:
1.   Paying for advertising is not speech while draft card burning public
sleeping and nude dancing are
or
2.   Compelling payment for third party communication does not
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implicate speech and thus the Government would be free to force
payment for a whole variety of expressive conduct that it could
not restrict.
In either case we have lost our way.”48
This case is yet another illustration of the danger of labeling Justices as conservative or liberal.
 Three so-called liberal Justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) are joined in the Court’s opinion by
two “conservatives” (O’Connor and Kennedy) to make up the majority.  The dissent, on the other
hand, has a moderate (Souter) writing an opinion, joined by three of the most “conservative” justices.
At this juncture, this moderate, conservative Court is divided on at least one  issue, the
Central Hudson test.  Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer seem less tolerant of the test
and prefer to test the veracity and non-deceptive character of the speech in question.  Others seek to
carefully scrutinize the “fit” between the restriction and the alleged or asserted State interest, while
Justices Thomas and Scalia seem to question any necessary “fit.”
On the issue of whether there should be a distinction between “commercial” and other speech,
Thomas has been outspoken in questioning the distinction, although Stevens questioned the concept
in Coors.   Justice Thomas’ position is indeed intriguing as it is closely allied to that of former Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun (and they certainly are not usually considered his ideological
compatriots).
Since there are perhaps five Justices who question the validity of all four parts of the Central
Hudson test, it is this group that bears watching as the issue of the Government’s attempt to regulate
commercial speech continues to be tested.  The Glickman case needs to be distinguished.  The
majority in Glickman decided that taken as a whole, the statute did not involve the issue of
commercial speech, while the dissenters were willing to separate various parts of the particular
statute and focus on the issue of  coerced  speech.  The split, I submit, was not so much on First
Amendment issues, but rather on the nature of statutory construction and interpretation.
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